I made the mistake of checking the headlines before bed, and the news for the Yankees does not look good. The NY Times and other outlets are reporting that the Yanks are seriously considering trading Chuck Knoblauch to the Seattle Mariners for Al Martin and Brett Tomko, and signing former Yankee outfielder Gerald Williams, recently released by the Tampa Bay Devil Rays, the worst team in baseball.
Friends, if ever we need evidence that the end of the Yankees reign as World Champions is nigh, it will be in the transaction lines that seal these deals. While Tomko would be a decent addition to the pitching staff, the moves will leave the moribund Yankee offense with even worse prospects, and go against the tenet around which the Yankee dynamo has been built: get on base.
career OBP 2001 OBP career SLG*OBP 2001 SLG*OBP
Chuck Knoblauch .384 .342 .159 .115
Al Martin .340 .305 .153 .105
Gerald Williams .306 .261 .128 .087
Slugging Percentage times On Base Percentage is a very crude stat I discussed a few days back; roughly speaking, it translates as runs created per at bat. Knoblauch has struggled this season, but even at his worst he is miles better than the competition at getting on base. If the Yanks plug one of these two cadavers in the leadoff spot, I will personally turn in my membership in the Joe Torre Is A Managerial Genius club card while the Yankee offense dies on the vine.
Gerald Williams hit 21 HR and drove in 89 runs for the last-place Rays last season. But he got on base at only a .312 clip and was as big a reason why the Rays remained the most pathetic offense in the league. He was released earlier this week because he was 66 plate appearances short of vesting a $4 million contract for 2002, and because the Rays seem to have caught on to his incompetence. Williams's agent made some hysterical noises about the release being unjustified, but anybody who analyzes Williams's stats can't help but conclude he's dragging an offense down.
Al Martin's claim to big league fame is that he was arrested for bigamy. As Chevy Chase says, that's illegal, even in Utah. Martin's having a hard time getting arrested on a ballfield lately, to the tune of a 648 OPS. He's a horrible LF as well, certainly no better than Knoblauch, who at least has the excuse of never playing out there before.
Knoblauch's baggage, along with an unconfirmed but long-rumored handshake deal for 2 years at $9 million per, is probably a driving force behind the Seattle deal. It doesn't help that he's in the midst of a 38-for-192 slump (.198). Tomko is a servicable swingman, having shown flashes of competence as a starter but much more consistency as a reliever (4.82 ERA as a starter, 3.64 as a reliever coming into this season). Ostensibly, he would fill the role Ramiro Mendoza doesn't seem capable of filling since coming back from surgery.
For the Yankees, losing Knoblauch at the top of the lineup would be the end of an era. He has never measured up to the player the Yanks thought they were getting from Minnesota in 1997, but his style of taking pitches and getting on base by any means necessary--including taking a pitch in the elbow--particularly in the midst of a rally, have earned him a spot near and dear to my heart. He's the Lil' Bastard Instant Rally Kit, as we say around here. The Yanks could move Derek Jeter to the leadoff spot--he's fared very well there in the past--or could elevate Alfonso Soriano. A month ago this move would have been laughable, as Soriano drew only 3 walks in his first 50 games. But Soriano has started to draw walks and cut down on his strikeouts. His OBP for June is .372, and he and Knoblauch have been swapping the league lead in stolen bases. It would be a huge risk given his lack of established ability to get on base, but the Yanks have already banked a considerable portion of their future on him, and they may believe he's turned a corner.
Still, these moves do not bode well for the Yankee offense, unless Torre can take At-Bats from some of the stiffs in the Yankee lineup. 200 plate appearances by Gerald Williams will not solve their problems, it will doom them.
Sometimes it appears that managers have taken the information revealed by the sabermetric revolution to heart. Falling pitch counts are one area, the increased emphasis in On Base Percentage is another.
But there's one area in particular where the statistical evidence points towards exactly the opposite of what most managers seem to do. And it's something that often costs them the ballgame. I'm talking about the tendency of a manager to let a tiring pitcher start off an inning in which he will be pulled if he gets into trouble.
First off there's the pitch count issue; the current working theory is that pitches beyond a certain threshold (say, 120 pitches) are more likely to lead to ineffectiveness and injury. That's a topic for another day, however.
In Bill James's 1987 Baseball Abstract, James reported on research done by Gary Skoog with regards to how many runs a team would score based on a certain situation (i.e., runner on first, one out). Here is that matrix:
Expected number of runs 0 outs 1 out 2 outs
no one on 0.454 0.249 0.095
runner on first 0.783 0.478 0.209
runner on second 1.068 0.699 0.348
runner on third 1.277 0.897 0.382
runners on first & second 1.380 0.888 0.457
runners on first & third 1.639 1.088 0.494
runners on second & third 1.946 1.371 0.661
bases loaded 2.254 1.546 0.798
What these numbers mean is that at the start of 1000 innings (0 on, 0 out), teams can be expected to score 454 runs. With a runner on first and no outs, that expectation rises to 783 runs per 1000 innings; with one out and nobody on, that expectation falls to 249 runs per 1000 innings.
The difference between those two states (runner on first, 0 out and no runner, 1 out) is greater than the expectation of runs at the start of the inning. The leadoff batter is THE MOST IMPORTANT BATTER. When he gets on, teams score runs--at LEAST three times as many runs as if the first batter makes an out.
So why in the HELL would a manager risk letting his (tiring) pitcher screw up the start of an inning? I'm sure it has something to do with instilling confidence in your starters (blah, blah, blah), wanting to save your bullpen (blah, blah, blah), or some bullshit along those lines. But unless your only relief options have been soaking in kerosene or are named
Bobby Ayala, this tendency strikes me as an incredibly backward way of thinking.
I realize the limitations of this matrix. Since these are averages, certain situations, such as having Rey Ordoņez leading off your inning (lower run expectancy at 0,0) or Barry Bonds (much, much higher), might dictate a change in strategy. Managers might also choose their pitcher here based on the platoon advantage (righty pitching to righty), but that advantage is only on the order of 20-25 points of batting average. And then there's the disadvantage of bringing in a reliever with men on base: pitching from the stretch, limited pitch selection, wild pitches... so much more can go wrong with a man on base.
I didn't watch Yankees game today, but Ted Lilly's pitch count was nearing 120 as he went back out for the 8th inning. He had a 4-1 lead, and had pitched a good ballgame, striking out 9 batters and allowing only 5 hits. Joe Torre had any number of options to get two innings out of the bullpen, including one of the best closers in the biz, Mariano Rivera. Rivera and setup man Mike Stanton have been overworked, but even if Torre didn't want to use them, he should have put his pen in the best situation possible to finish the game. And that means starting with a clean slate at the beginning of an inning.
Lilly allowed a double to Steve Cox and was done for the day. With the number of pitches he'd thrown, he wasn't going to throw a complete game, so why the hell was he still out there? Brian Boehringer came in, allowed a double and a walk before yielding to Stanton, who, with the roof on fire added just a little more Ronsonol, and when the ashes settled the Yanks were down 5-4.
It's easy to sit here and second-guess an individual set of decisions a manager makes. That's not my intention; Joe Torre has won four more World Championships than I have, and he's a fine manager. But he, and dozens of other managers I've watched since I first read Bill James, keep making this mistake, and it drives me crazy.
[Somebody whose site I discovered ('Rhoids Baseball, whatever the heck that is) in searching for the above table has updated the data based on more current run scoring tendencies. Here is the
revised table. The current values of 0 on, 0 out (0.58), runner on 1st, 0 out (0.98), and 1 out, 0 on (0.31) are all higher, but their ratios are similar enough that they don't change my argument.]